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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16945 
MARC CHESNUT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CORPUS DELICTI BY FAILING 
TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE· 
OWNER OF POSSESSION. 
The Respondent argues that the corpus delicti was 
proved becaus·e the intent to permanently deprive of posses-
sion is not a part of the corpus delicti of theft. In 
I) 
support of that proposition Respondent cites State v. 
Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (1977) and State v. Cazier, 521 P.2d 
554 (1974). In both those cases the defendant was asserting 
on appeal that the prosecution had failed to give proof, 
independent of the defendant's confession, that would link 
the accused with the commission of the crime. In both 
cases the court held that the connection of the accused 
with the crime is no part of the corpus delicti and affirmed. 
The statement in Cazier, quoted by Respondent, that the 
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corpus delicti does not include all the elements of the 
crime is made in particular reference to that one element. 
The most common definition of corpus delicti is 
quoted from McCormick in notes in Knoefler, supra at 176. 
To establish guilt it is generally necessary for 
the prosecution to show that a) the injury or 
harm specified in the crime occurred, b) this 
injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal 
activity, and c} the defendant was the guilty 
party. To sustain a conviction, the requirement 
of independent proof of the corpus delicti 
demands only that the prosecution have introduced 
evidence tending to show a) and b). 
In other words, the corpus delicti includes everything the 
prosecution must prove except the connection of the defen-
dant with the crime. The Appellant does not argue that the 
prosecution failed to give independent evidence of the 
accused's connection with the crime--he concedes that such 
evidence is not necessary. The Appellant argues rather 
that the prosecution failed to give independent evidence 
of the necessary element of the crime of theft: intent to 
deprive. 
In 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law Section 916(1}, also cited 
in ca.zier, it states: 
Corpus delicti means the body or substance of 
the crime, and may be defined in its primary 
sense as the fact that a crime actually has 
been committed. As applied to a particular 
offense, it means the actual commission by some-
one of the particular crime charged. [Emphasis 
added] 
The Respondent would seem to contradict that statement. 
The crime of theft has not been committed unless there 
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is an intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession 
of his goods. In not giving proof of that intent, the 
Respondent has failed to independently prove the corpus 
delicti. 
II 
AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF JOYRIDING 
WAS MANDATORY IN THE PRESENT CASE. 
In the case of State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 
(1976) this court carefully considered the circumstances 
under which a lesser included offense instruction may or 
must be given. Relying on the Nevada case of Lisby v. 
State, 82 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966) the court listed 
three situations where a lesser included offense instruc-
tion is appropriate. (The second situation is one in which 
the accused denies any complicity in the crime and is not 
directly applicable here.) As to the first situation this 
court said: 
First, where there is evidence which would absolve 
the defendant from guilt of a greater offense, or 
degree, but would support a finding of guilt of 
a lesser offense, or degreei the instruction is 
mandatory. (550 P.2d at 176) 
In the present case there was clearly evidence which would 
support a finding of not guilty of the greater offense and 
also support a finding of guilt of the lesser offense. 
The defendant admitted that he intended only to ride the 
motorcycle in a nearby vacant lot and failed to obtain 
permission to do so only because he could not wake the 
-3-
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owner. The Trial Transcript reads as follows: 
Q Let me draw your attention to the hours1 a 
few hours later than midnight on what would be 
then the 27th of June, did you have an occa-
sion to go over to Kenny's house? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What did you go over for? 
A To see if I could take his bike for a ride. 
Q What did you do when you got there? 
A I went to his door and knocked and nobody 
answered. 
Q How many times did you knock? 
A Oh, two or three. I figured he was asleep, 
so he's hard to wake up. 
Q What happened then? 
A Then I went around back to the side of his 
house and his bike was sitting there and I 
took it for a ride~ I didn't ride it~ I was 
going to take it for a ride. 
Q Where were you going to ride it? 
A In this vacant field that swings through to 
the school yard. It's all lit up and there is 
lights and stuff. 
Q I see. What were you going to do after you--
well, let me strike that. 
-4-
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Did you have any intent in your mind as to 
what you were going to do after you had 
ridden the bike? 
A I was going to take it back to where it was 
parked. 
Q You didn't intend to steal the bike? 
A No. 
Q You weren't going to take it permanently? 
A No. 
Transcript, 53, lines 19 through 30, p. 54, lines 
1 through 19. 
The third situation is even more applicable: 
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where 
the elements of the greater offense include all 
the elements of the lesser offense; because, by 
its very nature, the greater offense could not 
have been committed, without defendant having the 
intent in doing the acts, which constitute the 
lesser offense. In such a situation instructions 
on the lesser included offense may be given, 
because all elements of the lesser offense have 
been proved. However, such an instruction may 
properly be refused if the prosecution has met 
its burden of proof on the greater offense, and 
there is no evidence tending to reduce the greater 
offense. The court concluded by stating that if 
there be any evidence, however slight, on any 
reasonable theory of the case under which the 
defendant might be convicted of the lesser 
included offense, the court must, if requested, 
give an appropriate instruction. 550 P.2d at 176 
The Appellant certainly offered a reasonable theory of the 
case under which the requested instruction should have been 
given. 
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This Appellant's Reply Brief is respectfully 
n utt''-
submitted this ~~\-"' day of July, 1980. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed three copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, to the Utah Attorney 
General, Robert B. Hansen, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this · J {) ~ day of July, 1980. 
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